PA · run world-payments-2026-07-04 v13.3.0
content: ai_generated 142 sources retrieved model claude-sonnet-5 ·

Panama

PA schema world-payments-v1 trajectory: not recorded

Last updated · 14 modules · 61 sourced findings · 142 sources in the cumulative register

14Modulesbaseline.modules[]
61Findingsmodules[].findings[]
39Tier-1 sourcesrun_metadata.t1_source_count
Confidence mix (sums to 14 rendered modules; click to filter)

Jurisdiction brief

Lead Signal

Panama enters this monitoring cycle with its first comprehensive baseline assessment, and the standout finding is a persistent structural gap: the country still has no dedicated licensing regime for non-bank payment institutions or e-money issuers. The Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá (SBP) maintains a registry of Means of Payment/E-Money Issuers, but supervises those entities solely for anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist-financing and weapons-proliferation-financing purposes under Law 23 of 2015 — not under any prudential or conduct-of-business licensing framework. A World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program note flags that this creates public confusion between AML registration and genuine licensing, a distinction with direct commercial-relevance consequences for market entry and correspondent-bank due diligence. Panama's legislature moved to address the gap on 13 January 2026 with Anteproyecto de Ley No. 314, the Ley Marco Integral de Tecnologías Financieras, which would create Panama's first dedicated licensing categories for virtual-asset service providers, payment-service providers and e-money issuers, with SBP as primary supervisor and the Financial Analysis Unit (UAF) receiving suspicious-activity reports. The bill has not been enacted, and no forward committee or plenary date has been sourced this cycle.

14 of 14 modules
Signal
Density

Selections OR within a group, AND across groups. Press / to search.

#

Pennsylvania's Money Transmitter Act now covers virtual-currency transmission under Act 7 of 2025 (effective 2025-08-26), with the superseded 2024 VC statement of policy formally rescinded.

Movement — CHANGEDLicensing perimeter now covers virtual-currency transmission under Act 7 of 2025Act 7 of 2025 effective; MTA licensing extended to virtual-currency transmitters.
Open gap — wpm-int-2Draft Law 314's legislative status (committee/plenary stages, expected enactment timing) has no sourced forward date this cycle; status should be re-verified next cycle before any regulatory_horizon entry can be added.no under-indexing note recorded
Open gap — wpm-int-7No parallel/competing fintech legislative proposals (e.g. other draft bills reported to be under National Assembly review alongside Draft Law 314) were surfaced by this cycle's research beyond the single Draft Law 314 thread.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief274 words · last cycle wpm-2026-08-05

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Panama's Superintendencia de Bancos de Panamá (SBP) publishes a registry of Means of Payment and E-Money Issuers, but this registry is an anti-money-laundering, counter-terrorist-financing and weapons-proliferation-financing registration under Law 23 of 2015 rather than a prudential or conduct-of-business licence. A World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program technical note corroborates that this arrangement creates public confusion between AML registration and genuine licensing, with only four fintechs formally registered as Financial Obligated Parties according to secondary commentary. For non-bank payment institutions and e-money issuers, the practical effect is legal uncertainty that complicates market entry and correspondent-bank due diligence, since counterparties cannot rely on the registry as evidence of prudential supervision.

Periodic update · new data 2026-08-11 · run wpm-2026-08-05

Licensing, Authorisation & Market Access

Act 7 of 2025 (SB 202) is the structural licensing development for Pennsylvania this cycle: it extends Money Transmitter Act licensure to virtual-currency transmission conducted for a fee, effective August 26, 2025. This closes a licensing gap that had previously allowed fee-based virtual-currency transmission to operate outside the state's money-transmission licensing perimeter, and it is a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding corroborated by both the Pennsylvania Department of Banking and Securities' own announcement and the Pennsylvania Bulletin's statutory text. As a market-access matter, the change is squarely nonbank-PI/EMI-facing: bank-chartered payment service providers in Pennsylvania already operate under a distinct prudential supervisory track, so Act 7's extension of licensure to virtual-currency transmission principally affects nonbank payment institutions and electronic-money issuers offering virtual-currency transmission services, bringing them onto the same licensing, examination, and ongoing-compliance footing as fiat money transmitters rather than an unlicensed or ambiguously licensed model.

The underlying statute was renamed to the Money Transmission and Virtual Currency Transmission Business Licensing Law, with expanded definitions and exemptions, including a self-hosted-wallet carve-out and a business-entity transaction exemption; neither exemption type maps cleanly onto a standard licensing-exemption enum, which itself signals how bespoke Pennsylvania's carve-outs are relative to more standardized state virtual-currency licensing regimes elsewhere. This is a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding corroborated by law-firm secondary commentary. In parallel, Pennsylvania rescinded 10 Pa. Code Section 19.1a, its prior non-binding Virtual Currency Statement of Policy, in its entirety, effective the same date, on the basis that the guidance had become redundant once Act 7's statutory coverage took effect; this is a lifecycle transition from interpretive guidance to a licensing statute carrying enforcement consequences, and it is itself a high-confidence, Tier 1 finding. This is a standing-brief content-tier item rather than a dated dashboard entry, reflecting that Act 7 is a durable statutory change to the state's licensing perimeter rather than an episodic dashboard-level event, and market-access questions for virtual-currency transmission in Pennsylvania now rest on that statutory text rather than on the withdrawn policy statement.

Outlook

The practical significance of Act 7 for market access will be measured over coming cycles less by the statutory text itself, which is now settled and in effect, than by how the Department of Banking and Securities applies the new licensing perimeter in practice: whether virtual-currency transmitters previously operating in the state without a money-transmitter licence come forward to obtain one, and whether the self-hosted-wallet and business-entity exemptions are interpreted narrowly or broadly in early licensing determinations. No enforcement or licensing-decision data specific to the new virtual-currency transmission category has yet been reported this cycle; that is the next materiality threshold to watch for Pennsylvania's nonbank payment-institution and electronic-money-institution market-access conditions.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/authorizations/means-paymentretrieved
  2. T2https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3f2a65c9-efa5-4b1d-ad1b-dd721ca9be10retrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  4. T3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banking_in_Panamaretrieved
  5. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099040424151021308/pdf/P179962143f93d0531a2901588726639e71.pdfretrieved

#

Panama has no dedicated conduct-of-business or safeguarding regime for non-bank payment/e-money providers; consumer and conduct protection for banking relationships defaults to the SBP and ACODECO under general banking and consumer-protection law, with AML documentary/onboarding obligations tightened via SBP Rule 1-2026.

Standing sub-brief186 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Conduct, Safeguarding & Promotions

SBP Rule 1-2026, issued 16 January 2026, updates customer-due-diligence, enhanced-due-diligence, transaction-monitoring and internal-control obligations for all SBP-supervised entities, revoking prior rules 10-2015, 1-2013, 8-2000 and 10-2000. Secondary commentary anticipates a period of narrower fintech-client onboarding while institutions absorb the new compliance requirements, a conduct-adjacent effect that sits alongside the module's core safeguarding question.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1652retrieved
  2. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sac/preguntas-frecuentesretrieved
  4. T3https://www.infobae.com/panama/2026/06/24/panama-pone-orden-a-la-forma-de-evaluar-los-incumplimientos-bancarios/retrieved

#

Panama has no comprehensive crypto/stablecoin law in force. A 2021-22 crypto bill (Bill 697) was partially vetoed by President Cortizo in June 2022 over AML concerns and was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July 2023, leaving digital assets in a legal grey area; a renewed Bill No. 247 (2025) is pending before the National Assembly.

Open gap — wpm-int-3Bill No. 247's progression beyond its September 2025 subcommittee referral is not sourced this cycle; current legislative stage and any forward timeline are unconfirmed.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief212 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Stablecoins & Digital Money

Panama's most consequential crypto-regulatory event remains the 2022-23 nullification of Bill No. 697: partially vetoed by President Cortizo in June 2022 on anti-money-laundering grounds while Panama sat on the FATF grey list, then declared entirely unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in July 2023, resetting the country's legislative effort at comprehensive crypto regulation to zero. The Supreme Court's ruling sided fully with the President's veto objections, leaving no comprehensive crypto framework in force and establishing a legal precedent that now weighs on any future legislative attempt, including the pending Bill No. 247.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2022/06/17/panamanian-president-partially-vetoes-crypto-regulation-legislationretrieved
  2. T3https://sb-sb.com/services/crypto/crypto-license/latam/panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2025/07/31/panama-crypto-law-aims-to-make-the-country-a-bitcoin-hub/retrieved
  4. T3https://www.lightspark.com/knowledge/is-crypto-legal-in-panamaretrieved

#

Panama's operational-resilience framework for regulated financial entities rests on a set of pre-DORA SBP agreements covering outsourcing, electronic banking, and IT risk management, with cloud-service use outside Panama requiring prior SBP/SMV approval or notification; there is no consolidated cyber-resilience statute equivalent to DORA.

Standing sub-brief176 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Operational Resilience & Critical Infrastructure

Panama's operational-resilience framework rests on pre-DORA agreements issued by SBP and the Superintendencia del Mercado de Valores: Acuerdos 009-2005, 006-2011, 003-2012 and 005-2018 cover outsourcing, electronic-banking risk and IT-risk management respectively. Cloud services located outside Panama require prior SBP approval or SMV notification, and no consolidated cyber-resilience statute equivalent to the EU's Digital Operational Resilience Act exists; comparators such as DORA are cited by market commentary for contrast only, not as a benchmark Panama has adopted.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T2https://aws.amazon.com/financial-services/security-compliance/compliance-center/pa/retrieved
  2. T2https://aws.amazon.com/financial-services/security-compliance/compliance-center/pa/retrieved
  3. T3https://emailmarketingpanama.com/en/email-banking-financial-services.htmlretrieved
  4. T3https://gladiium.com/cybersecurity-panama/retrieved
  5. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099613104102429031/pdf/SECBOS1af572a90621b72716e27781ecaec.pdfretrieved

#

Card-scheme rails in Panama run through the domestic Telered/Clave debit network alongside Visa and Mastercard acceptance via bank-operated gateways; PCI DSS compliance is expected of payment gateways and processors but there is no bespoke Panamanian interchange-regulation or surcharging statute identified.

Open gap — wpm-int-5No source was found confirming or denying the existence of a Panamanian interchange-regulation or card-surcharging statute (W4); absence recorded as no_source, not confirmed non-existence.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief137 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Scheme & Network Compliance

All Panamanian banks operate through Telered's Clave debit-card system and the traditional ACH, alongside newer bank-specific instant-transfer platforms such as Yappy. Visa and Mastercard are accepted via bank-operated gateways, and no bespoke interchange-regulation or card-surcharging statute was identified in this cycle's research; the gap is recorded as no-source rather than confirmed non-existence.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://www.martesfinanciero.com/relieve/yappy-evoluciona-para-ser-una-plataforma-de-pagos-independiente/retrieved
  2. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  4. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/retrieved

#

Panama is a fully dollarized economy with no foreign-exchange controls, functioning as a regional trade-finance and correspondent hub; the dominant retail corridor is US-Panama remittances, while digital/mobile remittance fees remain persistently higher across Central America/Panama/Dominican Republic (CAPDR) than the global average despite a declining trend.

Standing sub-brief146 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Payment Corridor Dynamics

Panama remains fully dollarized with no foreign-exchange controls, functioning as a regional trade-finance and correspondent-banking hub. International Banking Center external deposits grew 14.72% to US$48,097 million, with Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic together accounting for over 58% of these funds, corroborating commentary on dollarization's attractiveness for cross-border platforms.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://globallawexperts.com/how-to-open-a-fintech-company/retrieved
  2. T1https://www.elibrary.imf.org/view/journals/001/2022/238/article-A001-en.xmlretrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1687retrieved
  4. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved

#

Panama's payments industry is dominated by an oversized International Banking Center of roughly 50-80 licensed banks, with domestic digital-wallet competition concentrated among a handful of bank-sponsored platforms (Yappy/Banco General, Nequi/Banistmo, Kuara/Global Bank-Banesco-MMG, Zinli/Banco Mercantil), rather than independent non-bank fintech challengers.

Standing sub-brief127 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Industry Structure & Commercial Dynamics

Panama hosts 50 to 80-plus licensed banks, and domestic digital-wallet competition is concentrated among bank-sponsored platforms — Yappy (Banco General), Nequi (Banistmo), Kuara (Global Bank-Banesco-MMG) and Zinli (Banco Mercantil) — rather than independent non-bank fintech challengers.

Illustrating the structural difficulty non-bank challengers face against bank distribution advantages, telco entrant Tigo Money (Millicom) soft-launched in August 2023 but was shut down by March 2024 — a single-source but illustrative market-structure signal about the durability of incumbent-bank wallet dominance.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T3https://www.centralamerica.com/investing/banking-in-panama/retrieved
  2. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://newsroompanama.com/2024/04/27/banco-general-yappy-makes-an-important-update/retrieved
  4. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  5. T2https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/panama-trade-financingretrieved

The most consequential recent payments-adjacent litigation is the Supreme Court's 2023 nullification of the vetoed crypto law; on the supervisory-enforcement side, the SBP operates a public sanctions register for banking/trust/AML breaches and has just codified (Acuerdo 3-2026) a graduated sanctions methodology to replace prior ad hoc practice.

Open gap — wpm-int-4Acuerdo No. 3-2026 (SBP graduated AML sanctions methodology) is sourced only via T3 secondary reporting (Infobae); no primary SBP gazette/text citation was retrieved this cycle for a regime instrument a T1 source could anchor.no under-indexing note recorded
Standing sub-brief134 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Legal & Litigation

The most consequential payments-adjacent litigation event remains the Supreme Court's July 2023 ruling declaring the entirety of crypto bill No. 697 unconstitutional, siding with President Cortizo's 2022 veto objections and nullifying Panama's first comprehensive attempt at crypto regulation.

More recently, SBP Acuerdo No. 3-2026 (29 May 2026) established uniform criteria classifying AML/CFT infractions as minor, serious or very serious, weighing duration, recidivism, harm and institution size, replacing what had been ad hoc sanctioning practice; this instrument is sourced only via T3 secondary reporting, with no primary SBP gazette text retrieved this cycle.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://sb-sb.com/services/crypto/crypto-license/latam/panama/retrieved
  2. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sanciones?field_year_sancion_value=Allretrieved
  3. T3https://www.infobae.com/panama/2026/06/24/panama-pone-orden-a-la-forma-de-evaluar-los-incumplimientos-bancarios/retrieved
  4. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099040424151021308/pdf/P179962143f93d0531a2901588726639e71.pdfretrieved

#

Merchant acquiring in Panama is delivered through bank-affiliated gateways (Banco General/Yappy Comercial, Banistmo, BAC Credomatic, Credicorp) plus independent processors (Wompi, Pagadito, Paguelofacil), with standard percentage-plus-tax merchant discount pricing and hybrid local-acquirer/global-PSP models used for multi-currency and tourism-sector acceptance.

Standing sub-brief126 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Merchant Acquiring & Risk

Yappy Comercial, Banco General's merchant-facing product, charges a commission of 1% plus ITBMS (minimum US$0.02) per transaction received, collected daily against that day's total received amount — a primary merchant-pricing disclosure drawn directly from the bank's own site.

Foreign PSPs can operate in Panama but typically must partner with a licensed local entity or establish local presence; tourism-sector merchants commonly combine local acquiring banks such as Banco General with global PSPs such as Worldline and Adyen to achieve multi-currency acceptance.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T2https://www.bgeneral.com/yappy/retrieved
  2. T3https://jootser.com/pasarelas-de-pago-para-e-commerce-en-panama/retrieved
  3. T3https://payatlas.com/countries/panama-paretrieved
  4. T3https://payatlas.com/countries/panama-paretrieved

#

Panama's payments innovation is led by bank-sponsored real-time mobile wallets built on the Telered/ACH Xpress rails, with Yappy the dominant platform and growing interoperability across banks; roughly 93% of the population is reported to use mobile banking, and Caja de Ahorros runs an agency-banking program for financial inclusion in remote areas.

Standing sub-brief134 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Product Innovation & Market Development

Telered's ACH Xpress instant-payment integration had 16 banks integrated by end-2023, executing 1.4 million transactions worth $18 million, with a stated goal of adding ten more banks under the renamed 'Xpress' platform — a clear signal of expanding bank-to-bank interoperability.

State savings bank Caja de Ahorros runs an agency-banking programme for financial inclusion, though agent locations remain absent from the most remote communities such as Darién province, and national postal operator COTEL's financial-service potential remains underutilised for lack of investment, per a World Bank/IMF payments technical note.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://elcapitalfinanciero.com/nequi-y-yappy-se-disputan-clientes-bancarios-en-panama/retrieved
  2. T4https://americaretail-malls.com/paises/centroamerica/panama-digital-el-93-de-la-poblacion-ya-usa-banca-movil/retrieved
  3. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/documentos/evaluaciones_fmi/NT-SPN-Pagos-Panama-Payments-TN.pdfretrieved
  4. T3https://www.prensa.com/economia/yappy-nequi-zinli-y-ahora-kuara-compiten-en-el-mercado-de-los-pagos-digitales-en-panama/retrieved

#

Consumer protection for payments splits between ACODECO (general commercial/advertising complaints under Law 45 of 2007, competence up to US$5,000, US$30,000 for vehicles) and the SBP (banking-specific consumer complaints); there is no dedicated APP-fraud mandatory-reimbursement regime, and refund mechanics for misdirected instant-payment transfers rely on voluntary bank features rather than statutory liability rules.

Standing sub-brief140 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Consumer Protection & APP Fraud

Under Law 45 of 2007, ACODECO can decide directly only on consumer complaints up to US$5,000 (US$30,000 for vehicles under Law 14 of 2018); beyond those thresholds consumers must pursue ordinary courts, and no dedicated APP-fraud mandatory-reimbursement regime exists in Panama's regulatory architecture.

Because Panamanian banking regulation prevents banks from unilaterally debiting a client's account for a misdirected transfer without authorization or a court order, Banco General added a voluntary immediate-refund function to Yappy after user complaints — illustrating reliance on industry practice rather than a statutory misdirected-payment liability regime.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (4)
  1. T3https://lawgratis.com/blog-detail/consumer-law-panamaretrieved
  2. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/sac/preguntas-frecuentesretrieved
  3. T3https://fmm.com.pa/panama-and-consumer-protection-in-the-digital-era/retrieved
  4. T3https://newsroompanama.com/2024/04/27/banco-general-yappy-makes-an-important-update/retrieved

#

sentinel.baseline: Panama's core AML/CFT instrument is Law 23 of 2015 (as amended), supervised by the SBP for financial obligated subjects and enforced via the newly codified Acuerdo 3-2026 sanctions methodology; Panama was FATF grey-listed June 2019 and formally delisted 27 October 2023, with the EU following in removing Panama from its high-risk list in 2024/2025.

Standing sub-brief184 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

AML/CFT & Financial Crime (Sentinel.gi-fed)

Per Sentinel.gi's feed, FATF excluded Panama from its grey list on 27 October 2023 (having listed the country since June 2019) after determining that strengthened AML/CFT controls were in place; the European Commission followed by removing Panama from its high-risk list on 14 March 2024, corroborated by two independent T1 anchors — the FATF country page and the EC removal document.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (6)
  1. T3https://www.laestrella.com.pa/amp/economia/panama-endurece-las-reglas-de-prevencion-de-delitos-financieros-en-los-bancos-HH23530869
  2. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) per-JID baseline profile — Panama — Panama exited the FATF grey list in October 2023 and the EU high-risk third-country list in June 2025. AML law criminalises laundering broadly and created a non-public UBO registry (Law 129/2020) under Superintendencia/UAF supervision, but domestic ML prosecution remains weak, professional-enabler oversight (CSPs, lawyers) is uneven, and no comprehensive VASP/crypto law is in force.
  3. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-002) — Gap: regulatory-failure
  4. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-005) — Gap: capacity-deficit
  5. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-003) — Gap: legal-gap
  6. T?FIM (sentinel.gi) gaps_register_cumulative (issue FIM-BASE-GAP-001) — Gap: enforcement-absence

#

Panama has no central bank and relies on Banco Nacional de Panamá as settlement bank for domestic clearing; correspondent-banking access has historically been sensitive to FATF/EU listing status, with post-2023 delisting improving relationships even as SBP Rule 1-2026 signals renewed compliance tightening to correspondent partners in the US and Europe.

Standing sub-brief186 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Correspondent Banking, Settlement & Access

Absent a central bank, Banco Nacional de Panamá operates the BNP clearinghouse, Panama's most important settlement system, with final settlement of net retail-payment positions effected in commercial-bank money on BNP's books; the World Bank's Financial Sector Assessment finds this settlement-risk management lacks sophistication, and participants can run largely uncollateralized net debit positions — the module's analytical spine is precisely this bank-versus-non-bank access asymmetry.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (5)
  1. T1https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099613104102429031/pdf/SECBOS1af572a90621b72716e27781ecaec.pdfretrieved
  2. T2https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/panama-officially-removed-from-fatf-grey-list-301970490.htmlretrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
  4. T1https://www.superbancos.gob.pa/en/node/1687retrieved
  5. T4https://ape.socialcatalystlab.org/papers/apep_1234/v1/paper.pdfretrieved

#

Panama's fintech investment activity remains modest in absolute terms relative to its role as a financial hub: trailing-12-month equity funding has been in the low tens of millions of dollars across a handful of rounds, with limited M&A exits in the fintech vertical, alongside the January 2026 legislative event of Draft Law 314's introduction.

Open gap — wpm-int-6Individual fintech funding-round and acquisition deal values in Panama are not disclosed in available sources (Tracxn aggregates only); deal-level commercial_event objects could not be populated this cycle.Private-company signal depth is structurally limited for Panama by aggregator-only coverage — a recognised WPM bias-correction area.
Standing sub-brief179 words · last cycle wpm-2026-07-04

Commercial Intelligence (M&A, Investment & Product)

Aggregate 2025 equity funding in Panama's fintech sector fell to $14.4 million across four rounds (through December), down from $18.4 million across nine rounds the prior year; individual deal values are not publicly disclosed. As of January 2026, only 67 of Panama's 707 fintech companies had received funding, and the sector recorded just one acquisition in the year through July 2025 against three historically — again with individual deal values not publicly disclosed.

No periodic updates recorded against this sub-brief.

Sources and findings (3)
  1. T4https://tracxn.com/d/geographies/panama/__M43a-AgsfK3LvgIGrffDKvH7UYcE9F8msaKUAD17KZgretrieved
  2. T4https://tracxn.com/d/explore/fintech-startups-in-panama/__yCpaKPFTlkZqAiiUSM-AyoXXfjbmrU1FCPMPyAFfEFsretrieved
  3. T3https://globallawexperts.com/panama-fintech-law-2026-draft-law-no-314-sbp-rule-1-2026-licensing-aml-and-bank-access/retrieved
No modules match.

Filters combine as OR inside a group and AND across groups.

Editorial metadata

Provenance only. Nothing below gates publication or affects the render.

Editorial metadata for Panama
FieldValue
trust.lawyer_review.statusnever_reviewed
trust.lawyer_review.reviewernot recorded
trust.content_sourceai_generated

Provenance and declared absence

Disclosure model: module cards load OPEN; standing positions render in full; sub-briefs and jurisdiction briefs load as a clamped teaser with an explicit “read full” control carrying the true word count; earlier updates stay collapsed behind a counted summary. No text is hidden without disclosing how much of it there is.

Sentinel-fed modules receive no special rendering treatment. sentinel_feed is an attribution chip only: it does not suppress content, does not generate an absence reason code, and does not exclude the module from any count, filter, search index or export on this page.

Family taxonomy is renderer-level presentation config, not a JID field. Colour is always duplicated in text and is never the sole carrier of meaning.

Suppressed by doctrine: derived risk score; per-module RAG traffic light; derived_scores = {"legal_accessibility": {"per_product": {"account_to_account": "regulated", "cards": "regulated"}}}.

Band honesty: uncertainty bands are computed against a frozen build clock of 2026-08-11. A year-precision row is never promoted into a tighter band.

Orphan deltas: 2 cycle_delta row(s) target non-module objects and are listed in the rail rather than attached to a card.

Envelope: baseline resolved at jurisdiction_json.baseline; 14 module(s), 61 finding(s), 158 source(s) in the cumulative register.